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Abstrakt
Analýza bezpečnostních incidentů se stala velmi důležitým a zajímavým oborem počí-
tačové vědy. Monitorovací nástroje a techniky pomáhají při detekci a prevenci proti tímto
škodlivým aktivitám. Tento dokument opisuje počítačové útoky a jejich klasifikaci. Také
jsou tady opsaný některé monitorovací nástroje jako Intrusion Detection System nebo Net-
Flow protokol a jeho monitorovací software. Tento dokument také opisuje konfiguraci exper-
imentální topologie a prezentuje několik experimentů škodlivých aktivit, které byly detailně
kontrolovány těmito monitorovacími nástroji.
Abstract
Analysis of network incidents have become a very important and interesting field in Com-
puter Science. Monitoring tools and techniques can help detect and prevent against these
malicious activities. This document describes computer attacks and their classification.
Several monitoring tools such as Intrusion Detection System or NetFlow protocol and its
monitoring software are introduced. It is also described the development of an experimental
topology and the results obtained on several experiments involving malicious activity, that
were overseen in detail by these monitoring tools.
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Introduction
Security incidents in network traffic have become very common. It is possible to consider as
incidents: viruses, DOS attacks or any malicious activities to destroy or access the network
without authorization. As a computer network evolves, the number of computer attacks
rises. Thus it is indispensable the implementation of security solutions that can provide
many possibilities to protect sensitive data of users and organizations.
There are two fundamentally different networks, data networks and synchronous net-
works comprised of switches. The Internet is considered a data network. Since the current
data network consists of computer based routers, information can be obtained by special
programs, such as “Trojan horses”, planted in the routers [7]. In the synchronous network
there is no collecting or buffering of data. For this reason this part of the network is not a
target for attackers.
As previously mentioned, the aims of the attackers are mainly personal data or sensitive
information. Thus computer and network security is not only a technical issue, but it also
includes social engineering. The education of users by network administrators or security
experts can make big differences regarding the protection of networks, with measures like
setting a password policy [25].
There are several solutions to protect the networks: anti-virus software, firewall, etc.
The design and configuration of the network topology also have a big role in security. All
these factors can contribute to avoid unauthorized access to sensitive data.
This document will introduce several software solutions to secure network topologies.
The classification of computer attacks will help create an idea about the basic attributes
and behavior of the attacks. The following text consists of:
 Classification of network attacks
 NetFlow
 Intrusion detection and prevention systems
 Network Topology
 Security incidents
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Chapter 1
Classification of network attacks
Fundamentally (as is shown in Figure 1.1), it is possible to divide attacks in two types:
active and passive attacks[11]. Every type of attack is specific and requires unique software
or methodology for realization. It is possible to consider as a passive attack the scanning
of a network topology using various tools (some of them will be described later) or just the
monitoring of traffic between two or more devices. Generally it is a preparation for active
attacks. Active attacks are more diversified, but also more dangerous. There are many
types of active attacks, depending on the target in the network (server, router or client
computer) and the goal of the attacker.
Figure 1.1: Division of network attacks by RFC 2828.
1.1 Passive attack
A passive attack consists of eavesdropping or monitoring the transmission in the network.
The goal of the opponent is to obtain the data that is being transmitted. There are two
types of passive attacks (as is shown in Figure 1.2): data content monitoring (such as
emails, phone calls) and network scanning [22].
Passive attacks are difficult to detect, because they do not involve any unusual activity
in the network. Typically, the information is being sent and received through the network
in an apparently normal way, and neither sender nor receiver is able to detect that a third
party (attacker) is scanning traffic or reading data in the network. However, it is possible
to protect the network against these attacks, with firewalls and encryption of the data in
the network. Thus, the emphasis when dealing with passive attacks is prevention rather
than detection [22].
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Figure 1.2: Division of passive attacks.
1.1.1 Data content monitoring
Data content monitoring or packet sniffing is an attack, in which the opponent is listening
to weak encrypted or non encrypted communication of one or more users and collecting
data for future attacks. This data can be used later to access user accounts or to perform
a masquerade attack [21]. Figure 1.3 shows an example of packet sniffing scenario.
Figure 1.3: Data content monitoring.
Packet sniffing consists of looking at every packet in the network, including packets that
are not intended for the receiver. This method analyzes the packets in every TCP/IP layer
and provides information for later analysis. Packet sniffers can be run on both non-switched
and switched networks [21].
Wireshark
Wireshark1 is a network protocol analyzer. It is used for analyzing packets and packet
sniffing. This network analyzer provides several tools for monitoring and capturing network
traffic. Network professionals, security experts, developers, and students around the world
use it regularly. In Figure 1.4 is shown the environment provided by Wireshark. It supports
most of the computing platforms such as Windows, OS X or Linux [2].
1For more information: https://www.wireshark.org.
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Figure 1.4: Wireshark environment.
1.1.2 Network scanning
Network scanning attack or reconnaissance is a kind of information gathering on the network
system and services. Without any knowledge about the network topology, the attacker tries
to obtain information from this topology using diversified software and protocols. With this
information, the attacker is then able to find weak points in the network and choose a target
for the next step. Network scanning can consist of:
 Internet information lookup
 Port Scans
 Ping Sweeps
It is possible to obtain information from the Internet using several tools such as whois or
nslookup. These tools can provide information about the range of IP addresses reserved by
an organization, the domain name information from the DNS server or which services are
provided by the organization. Afterwards it is possible, by sending packets into the network,
to discover which IP addresses are active and how many devices exist in the network. This
method is also known as ping sweeping. There is also port scanning, when the attacker
tries to discover which ports are open or available. An example of network scanning attack
is shown in Figure 1.5 [17].
6
Figure 1.5: Example of reconnaissance attack.
WHOIS
WHOIS is a query response protocol that provides information services to Internet users.
This protocol provides information such as registered domain names or the block of IP
addresses reserved by an organization, but it can be also used to obtain other information
[6].
Ping, FPING
Using ICMP ECHO messages is one of the basic steps to discover active devices in the
network. Ping is a tool used to send ICMP ECHO packets and receive ICMP ECHO-
REPLAY packets. The use of this tool is acceptable when the goal is to determinate a
small number of devices or scan small networks. However, scanning large class A networks
can take hours. Thus, it is better to use automatic tools as fping. Unlike the traditional
Ping Sweep utilities, that wait for a response from each system before moving on to the
next host, FPING is an utility that will send a huge amount of ping packets in parallel,
being much faster [4].
Nmap
Nmap is a tool used for port scanning. It sends seven TCP/IP crafted packets and waits
for a response. The results are compared with data in the database of known answers.
This database is a text file that consists of answers from each known OS. When the answer
matches a pattern is possible to guess that the target machine is running in a specific type
of OS. Packets are sent to open and closed ports. This tool also provides information about
ports and services that are running in the target device [3]. Figure 1.6 shows an example
of a Nmap output.
1.2 Active attack
As an active attack is possible to consider every unauthorized intervention in the network,
where the attacker modifies data or creates data stream. The attacker in this case is trying
to break into or bypass the secure network. Providing protection against this type of attack
is more difficult. By the characteristics of the attacks is possible to divide them into three
7
Figure 1.6: Example of a Nmap output.
categories, as it is shown in Figure 1.7: masquerade, modification and denial of service
[1][11].
Figure 1.7: Division of active attacks.
1.2.1 Masquerade
The masquerade attack is a kind of attack in which the attacker illegitimately uses the
identity of a legitimate user. The aim of this attack is to reach sensitive information such
as data or credit cards numbers. A good example is to illegitimately use the identity of a
client in a financial transaction [19].
Masquerade attacks can occur in several ways: accessing victim’s account and steal
sensitive data, or install software for accessing or monitoring such as Rootkit and key
logger. As a masquerade attack it is also possible to consider physical access to devices,
when the victim leaves his computer logged in and unattended [19].
An example of a masquerade attack is presented in Figure 1.8, where the attacker access
the User1 account and with his identity sends messages to User2. It should not be physical
or logical access to the victim’s computer. It can be also an access to the information
system or an email account.
1.2.2 Modification
Modification attack is an attack in which someone in the middle is listening in the com-
munication or modifying this communication, for example the content of the message.
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Figure 1.8: Masquerade attacks.
Afterwards, the attacker can send it to the receiving node of the communication or to more
users [11].
1.2.3 Denial of service
Danial of service or DoS attack is a malicious attempt where one or more attackers prevent
users to access services provided by a device placed in the network, by consuming all the
system resources. This type of attack has specific target and most of the time is classified
as a very trivial attack although its effectiveness is high. With this attack, the attacker
can potentially destroy the network [8][17][22]. An architecture of DoS attack is shown in
Figure 1.9 There are several types of DoS attacks but the basic ones are:
 Ping of death
 SYN Flood
Figure 1.9: Denial of service attack.
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Ping of death
The ping of death attack started to be well known in the latest 1990s. This attack takes
advantage from old operating systems that are not enough secured. The principle of the
attack is to send to a victim’s computer ICMP packets, modifying the header of these
packets to indicate bigger sizes than the real ones. A normal ICMP packet has 64 or 84
bytes, but after the header modification it can have 65 536 bytes. Sending this size of
packet can crash the victim’s computer very easily. Recent networks and computers are
more resistant to this type of attack [17].
SYN Flood
SYN flood attack uses the three way handshake (Figure 1.10), that is a common method
used to establish a connection. The attacker sends a SYN request to the target, then the
target replies with an ACK-SYN, but the opponent does not reply with a final ACK. The
aim of the SYN flood is to tie up resources in the victim’s machine that then will not be
able to respond to users [17][12].
Figure 1.10: Three way handshake.
1.3 Software attacks
It is possible to consider as software attacks any malicious program (software) spread
through the network. This software is generally well know as a computer virus, although
this is not the perfect definition. An informal definition of “Computer Viruses” was first
published in 1984 by Cohen and was followed in 1985 by a formal definition [15].
There are several types of computer viruses, but in this paper it will be introduced only
their basic classification and characteristics. The protection against this kind of attack can
be provided by anti-virus software. This software is not perfect and can protect users only
against well known attacks.
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1.3.1 Virus
Computer virus is code or software that replicates and spreads itself. Viruses infect the file
system or the operating system and modify the reference to such objects to take control
and then multiply again. The existence of a computer virus is easy to recognize when a
decrease of the disc space or a slow down of the operating system is detected [22].
1.3.2 Worm
Worm is a malicious program whose aim is to infect the victim’s computer and take control
of the objects in the system. The difference between viruses and worms is that a computer
worm spreads in the network by itself, and does not need the user for that. However,
there are also worms that need intervention from the users, such as mailer or mass-mailer
worms. The classification of computer worms depends on their characteristics and methods
of propagation [15] [24]. There are several types:
 Mailers and Mass-Mailer Worms
 Octopus
 Rabbits
1.3.3 Trojan horse
A Trojan horse is a malicious software that covers its illegal functionality using some helpful
software or game. It is very common that this malicious code is part of some open source
software since it is very easy to add this illegal functionality in such program. Most of the
Trojans create back-doors or loopholes. For example, on UNIX-based systems, attackers
add a cover functionality to the ps utility (UNIX tool for showing running processes) that
can relate to another process, creating a back-door in the victim’s system. This type of
Trojans are well known as user mode rootkits. Generally, Trojans can also relate to another
malicious activity, such as monitoring the victim’s system [15][17].
1.4 Other types of attack
In this part will be described and shown some computer attacks using several methods.
To prevent these kinds of attack it is important to understand their principles and to be
prepared to apply security policies against them.
1.4.1 Distributed denial of service
Distributed denial of service or DDoS is an attack in which several machines infected by the
attacker’s malicious software simultaneously attack the victim’s device or system. There
are mainly two types of DDoS attack: classical DDoS attack and distributed reflector DoS
(DRDoS) [18].
The classical distributed DoS consists of master zombies and slave zombies. All these
devices are infected by the malicious software. The attacker can coordinate only master
zombies and the master zombies can coordinate slave zombies. This pyramid structure
works in such a way that all devices are in sleeping mode, and waiting for an impulse from
the attacker. The attacker sends a message with the target specification to the master
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Figure 1.11: Distributed denial of service.
zombie and this master zombie distributes this message to the slave devices that then wake
up and start the attack to the victim. The architecture of the classic DDoS attack is shown
in Figure 1.11 [18].
The Distributed reflector attack is shown in Figure 1.12 and it is similar to the classical
distributed DoS. The difference between them is that in this case the pyramid structure
described previously is increased by one layer of the reflector devices. The principle of
the attack is the same, although the slave zombies are not attacking victim computers.
They send modification messages, for example ICMP messages, where the source address is
changed to be the victim’s one. This provides to the attacker more devices to attack, and
thus it is more detrimental than the classical DDoS [18].
1.4.2 Phishing attack
Phishing is an attack whose aim is to gain sensitive data from the user (such as credit card
numbers) or to access information of the user’s account. In this case the attackers create a
website, for example a fake bank website, that looks like the same as the original one. Using
this website they can simulate some catastrophic scenario in which something happened in
the bank. This information is then sent to the victim, most of the time by email, informing
the user that this catastrophic scenario happened to the organization and they need the
user to verify his access information [11].
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Figure 1.12: Distributed reflector denial of service.
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Chapter 2
NetFlow
NetFlow is a monitoring service introduced by Cisco that provides to administrators infor-
mation about the data network, such as the source and the destination address between
communicating nodes, the number of transmitted packets, the size of transmitted packets,
etc. (full specification can be found in [5]). This information is grouped into a record
called flow or NetFlow and sent from a network element (router, switch) to a station called
collector. This station collects the NetFlow data of one or several devices and stores them
into a database, making them visible to the user [5].
2.1 Architecture and terminology
The NetFlow service, when implemented in a real environment, consists of several parts. In
this section will be described the basic terms of the architecture and the basic terminology
commonly used with this technology.
2.1.1 Exporter
An Exporter is a device, such as a router or a switch, that provides the NetFlow service.
It means that this device monitors the data from an observation point (one or a set
of interfaces), and creates flows. These flows are packets passing through the observation
point in a certain period of time. The information flow is transferred to a Flow Record and
sent to a device called NetFlow Collector [5].
2.1.2 NetFlow Collector
A NetFlow Collector receives Flow Records from one or several Exporters. These packets
from the Exporters are processed by this device, parsed and stored as a Flow record infor-
mation. Practically, the NetFlow Collector receives two types of packets. The first type is
the Template Record and the second one is the Flow Record. Template Records generally
increase the flexibility of process of the Flow Records, because they provide to the Collector
the process of the Flow Record packets without knowing all the interpretation and data in
the Flow Record [5].
2.1.3 Others terms
”
A Flow Record provides information about IP Flow observed in observation point or
device interface“ [5].
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”
A Template Record defines information and interpretation of fields in Flow Data
Record“ [5].
”
A Flow Data Record is a data record that contains values of the Flow parameters
corresponding to a Template Record“ [5].
”
An IP Flow or Flow is a set of IP packets passing an Observation Point during a
time interval. All packets that belong to a particular Flow have a set of common properties
(data contained in the packet)“ [5].
”
An Observation Point is a location in the network where IP packets can be observed
(interface/interfaces of a router)“ [5].
2.2 Visualization software
There are several tools available for visualization of the NetFlow data. It processes received
packets and stores them in a hard-disk or database where the data can be analyzed or
visualized by a visualization software. All visualizations are done by third party companies,
since Cisco does not provide this feature. Some of the visualization applications provide
complex analysis environment, including the NetFlow Collector as well.
2.2.1 NetFlow Analyzer 11
NetFlow Analyzer 11 is an application that provides collection of NetFlow packets ,or other
flow packets (sFlow, IPFIX, etc.), supported by enterprise devices (routers, switches). It
then generates traffic reports for better understanding of what is happening in the network.
The report consists of several charts providing information about bandwidth, types of
packets and many other useful information. This application was created by ManageEngine
corporation. It also provides some additional features, such as faster troubleshooting of the
network, validation of QoS policies, scheduling of reports, IP grouping, etc. Figure 2.1
shows an example of the graphical environment of the application [14].
Figure 2.1: Graphical environment of the NetFlow Analyzer 11
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Chapter 3
Intrusion detection and prevention
systems
Intrusion detection and prevention systems are commonly used in modern network architec-
tures. There are several methods to implement this technology in a network infrastructure.
This chapter will describe the basic terminology and architecture of these systems.
3.1 Intrusion detection systems
Intrusion detection is a process of monitoring that analyzes events from computers and
network traffic to identify a network intruder or attacker. This automation process is
provided by an intrusion detection system. This software mainly provides the following
features [20][10]:
 Monitoring and analysis of user and system activity
 Audit of system configurations and vulnerabilities
 Assess of critical system integrity and data files
 Statistical analysis of activity patterns based on matching known attacks
 Abnormal activity analysis
 Operating system audit
3.1.1 Host intrusion detection system
Host intrusion detection system (HIDS) is a software agent in the host system that analyzes
data or traffic. Modern hosts run in background on critical machines, such as DNS, MAIL
and other types of servers. The HIDS takes a snapshot of your current system and compares
it with a previous snapshot. If it detects some modification in the critical files, an alert is
sent to the administrator [10][20].
3.1.2 Network intrusion detection system
Network intrusion detection system (NIDS) is an independent platform that collects and
analyzes data from network traffic. NIDSs collect the traffic by connecting to different parts
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of the network, such as hubs, switches, routers and other network devices. When an attack
is identified, the NIDS sends an alert to the network administrator [10][20].
3.1.3 Network node intrusion detection system
Network node intrusion detection system (NNIDS) is very similar to the NIDS. It also
analyzes the network traffic. The difference between NIDS and NNIDS is that in the
NNIDS the network traffic is monitored only in single hosts [10].
3.1.4 Intrusion detection system components
There are four typical components in network detection systems: sensor, management
server, database server and console.
 Sensors or agents are used to monitor the network. They are placed in strategic
places in the network topology, where they can collect data and send it to the man-
agement server. Sensors or agents can be a software or a hardware device. The term
sensor is used more frequently in network monitoring systems and the term agent in
host-based systems [20].
 Management server is a centralized device that collects data from sensors and
agents and manages them. Some management servers perform analysis that the agents
and sensors are not able to do. This device compares events, analyzes them and
matches events from multiple sensors [20].
 Database is a component in the architecture where all the alerts from the manage-
ment server are stored. It can be any kind of database, depending on which type of
IDS is supported [20].
 Console is a program that provides an interface for the IDS or a configuration inter-
face for sensors and agents. These consoles are installed on standard computers and
laptops [20].
3.2 Placement of the IDS in the network
There are several methods to place an intrusion detection system in the network. Every
method has its advantages and disadvantages that will be described below. In every sce-
nario, as shown in the example of Figure 3.1, will be used a network topology that consists
of two servers, one computer and an IDS station. Red lines will represent the connection be-
tween the IDS station and the network traffic. Dashed lines will represent the management
connection that is used for accessing or upgrading the station [16].
3.2.1 IDS using hub or spanning port
The scenario in Figure 3.1 shows an IDS station placed under a device, that is redistributing
the traffic among the station. This device can be a switch or hub. In the case of using a
switch, all traffic is captured and analyzed in a specific port that is configured as a spanning
port. Using a hub can cause security risks since all connected devices can read the traffic.
The system in the internal network is not at the mercy of an IDS network failure, that
could bring the network down. In this type of connection is common to place sensors in
the internal network [16].
17
Figure 3.1: IDS using hub or spanning port
3.2.2 IDS using tap
It is possible to connect the IDS to the network tap behind the switch as is shown in Figure
3.2. The network tap ID hardware device transfers information from the network traffic
without disrupting it. This concept is not very common, but is useful when it is necessary
to setup a host monitoring station or troubleshoot a problem temporarily by the IDS. Also
it can be used if there is no switch or hub in the network or the network architecture does
not support inline connection. The advantage is that the IDS can analyze all the traffic
passing from the internal network to outside [16].
Figure 3.2: IDS using network tap
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3.2.3 IDS connected inline
The inline connection of the IDS, another possibility when creating an IDS network in-
frastructure, is shown in Figure 3.3. The connections represented by red color show the
interfaces where the traffic is monitored by the IDS and all the traffic that is passing
through these interfaces. The dashed line represents the connection for device manage-
ment. This architecture is not the best alternative of how to use IDS.
”
System failure of
the IDS failure will prevent systems on the internal network from communicating with ex-
ternal systems“[16]. The advantage of this architecture is that all outcoming and incoming
packets will be seen by the IDS. In this scenario is not possible to monitor by the IDS the
communication between the devices inside the internal network [16].
Figure 3.3: IDS connected inline
3.3 Intrusion prevention system
Intrusion prevention system (IPS) is an extension of the intrusion detection system. How-
ever, instead of detection it provides prevention before the attack. It is possible to classify
it as a firewall in the network. IPSs were created to stop attacks in real time and protect
the network. It is an active in-line device that can drop attacks and perform activities to
stop attacks, such as disconnect ports before the intrusion happens[9].
19
Chapter 4
Network topology
This chapter describes the network topology and its configuration. This topology will be
used to run several experiments where the main goal is to monitor the behavior of computer
attacks and malware.
4.1 Network topology
All network topology is running in a virtual environment (in this case it was used VMWARE
Workstation 11). The basic network topology consists of a router, a server running an IDS
and a computer connected to a virtual switch. Due to the impossibility of configuring a
spanning port in the virtual switch provided by the virtualization software, the IDS was
connected inline as described in section 3.2.3. The network topology is shown in Figure 4.1.
Figure 4.1: Topology used for the experiments
4.2 Router configuration
The router used was a Mikrotik RouterOS1 for PC. This router was created virtually with
two interfaces. One port is used for connection to the INTERNET, and another is connected
to the network 192.168.12.0/24. Since the router is placed in a virtual environment, the
interface connected to INTERNET is in a NAT network.
1For more information: http://www.mikrotik.com.
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4.2.1 Interfaces configuration
The router has two interfaces. The first one is connected to the network 192.168.30.0/24
using the IP address 192.168.123.254/24. This network is used as a connection between
the router and the IDS station. The second interface is connected to a NAT network
192.168.123.12.0/24 with IP address 192.168.12.50/24. An example of how to add and
configure the addresses is shown in Figure 4.2.
[admin@Mikrotik] > ip address
[admin@Mikrotik] > add address=192.168.123.50/24 interface=ethernet2
Figure 4.2: Example of interface configuration
4.2.2 Routing and NAT
To communicate with the outside network is necessary to configure routing and NAT trans-
lation.
For the routing it is necessary to configure a default gateway (in this environment it
is 192.168.12.2/24). The static routing also needs to be set to allow the communication
between the outside and the internal network (192.168.123.0/24). This routing consists of
a rule, in which all incoming traffic is sent to the address 192.168.123.253. This IP address
represents the network interface of the IDS. The traffic from this interface is redirected to
the internal network. An example of the routing configuration is shown in Figure 4.3.
[admin@Mikrotik] > ip route
[admin@Mikrotik] > add gateway=192.168.12.2
[admin@Mikrotik] > add dst-address=192.168.123.0/24 pref-src=192.168.30.254
gateway=192.168.30.253
Figure 4.3: Example of the routing configuration
The NAT translation is set in the router interface (IP address 192.168.30.254/24). All
the traffic from the networks 192.168.123.0/24 and 192.168.30.0/24 is translated to the
address 192.168.12.50. Figure 4.4 shows an example of NAT configuration in a Mikrotik
router.
[admin@Mikrotik] > ip firewall nat
[admin@Mikrotik] > add chain=srcnat action=masquerade
to-addresses=192.168.12.50 src-address=192.168.30.0/24
[admin@Mikrotik] > add chain=srcnat action=masquerade
to-addresses=192.168.12.50 src-address=192.168.123.0/24
Figure 4.4: Example of NAT configuration
21
4.2.3 NTP client
The NTP client was configured to allow time synchronization of all devices in the network.
The NTP server is running on the address 192.168.123.1/24. Figure 4.5 shows an example
of the NTP client configuration.
[admin@Mikrotik] > system ntp client
[admin@Mikrotik] > set primary-ntp=192.168.123.1 mode=unicast enabled=yes
Figure 4.5: Example of NTP client configuration
4.2.4 TrafficFlow
To monitor and analyze the traffic passing through the router it was configured a NetFlow
service. This service is represented in the Mikrotik router as a TrafficFlow service. The
Exporter is configured to send data to the NetFlow Collector (IP address 192.168.123.1/24)
in version 9. The configuration of the TrafficFlow is shown in Figure 4.6.
[admin@Mikrotik] > ip traffic-flow target
[admin@Mikrotik] > add address=192.168.123.1:9996 version=9
[admin@Mikrotik] > enable numbers=0
Figure 4.6: Example of TrafficFlow configuration
4.3 Server configuration
For experiments it was used CentOS 7 server. This server provides several services (DNS,
DHCP, etc.) and was also used as an IDS monitoring station connected inline. This server
has 3 interfaces, where the first one is used for service distribution. The second interface is
used as a default gateway with all the traffic being redirected to a third port connected to a
different network, which is used as a connection between the router and the IDS monitoring
station. This connection makes it possible to monitor all in-coming and out-coming traffic.
Before any configuration is done it is necessary to disable SELinux. The configu-
ration file is placed in /etc/selinux/config. In this file it is required to set the option
SELINUX=disable. After that it is necessary to restart the server.
For better monitoring of the network it is recommended to disable the firewall. An
example of how to disable the firewall on CentOS 7 is shown in Figure 4.7.
[root@zeus ∼]# service firewalld stop
[root@zeus ∼]# chkconfig firewalld off
Figure 4.7: Example of how to disable firewalld
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4.3.1 Interface configuration
As a first step to configure the interfaces it is recommended to turn off the NetworkManager
service. It is possible to disable this service using two commands, as shown in Figure 4.8.
[root@zeus ∼]# service NetworkManager stop
[root@zeus ∼]# chkconfig NetworkManager off
Figure 4.8: Example of how to disable NetworkManager
The files to configure the interfaces are placed in /etc/sysconfig/network-scripts. In
this directory are placed all the configuration scripts of the network interfaces and the
routing rules. The configuration files start with the prefix ifcfg-interface name. In these
configuration files was necessary to add or change several options. These options manage
static IP address configuration of the interface, interface start when the system boots,
DNS, etc. The default gateway needs to be set only in the interface belonging to the
IDS (192.168.33.0/24). In the interface that provides services for the internal network
is necessary to set the DNS option to a local address. The option NM CONTROLLED
manages if the interface is configured by the NetworkManager service. All the options are
similar as is shown in Figure 4.9, but with different IP address, default gateway and DNS.
...
BOOTPROTO=no
ONBOOT=yes
IPADDR=192.168.123.253
NETMASK=255.255.255.0
GATEWAY=192.168.33.254
NM CONTROLLED=no
...
Figure 4.9: Part of the interface configuration file
4.3.2 DNS
The installation of the DNS required two packages: bind and bind-utils. In the main
configuration file (placed in /etv/named.conf ) is necessary to set the forwarders and add
two records, specifying a new zone. The internal network is placed in the leopard.org
domain. The zone files are placed in the /var/named directory. There are two files, a zone
file leopard.org and a reverse zone file 123.168.192.db. An example of the options required
for setting the DNS in named.conf is shown in Figure 4.10. The DNS zone files are shown
in appendix B.
4.3.3 DHCP
The DHCP service required the installation of the dhcp package. The configuration is
located in /etc/dhcp/dhcpd.conf file. In this file is necessary to set several options. The
range of IP addresses provided by the server in the testing topology goes from 192.168.123.50
to 192.168.123.100. There is also the possibility of setting IP addresses for the router, SNTP
server, etc. This service was included to test the topology to automatic obtain IP addresses
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options {
...
listen-on port 53 {127.0.0.1; 192.168.123.1};
allows-query {any};
forwarders {
130.190.190.4;
8.8.8.8;
8.8.4.4;
};
};
...
zone ”leopard.org” IN {
type master;
file ”leoprd.org”;
allow-update {none;};
};
zone ”123.168.192.in-addr.arpa” IN {
type master;
file ”123.168.192.db”;
allow-update {none;};
};
Figure 4.10: Example of named.conf file
for the computers connected in the internal network. Figure 4.11 shows the configuration
file of the DHCP service.
option domain-name ”leopard.org”;
option domain-name-servers 192.168.123.1;
default-lease-time 600;
max-lease-time 7200;
authoritative;
subnet 192.168.123.0 netmask 255.255.255.0 {
range 192.168.123.50 192.168.123.100;
option broadcast-address 192.168.123.255;
option routers 192.168.123.254;
option subnet-mask 255.255.255.0;
option ntp-servers 192.168.123.1;
}
Figure 4.11: DHCP configuration file
To make DHCP listens only on specific ports it is necessary to copy the file from /us-
r/lib/systemd/dhcpd.service to the directory placed in /etc/systemd/system/. In this file
it is required to add the name of the network interface (for ex. eno33554984) in the end
of the line starting with ExecStart=. After this modification it is necessary to reload
the configuration with ”$ systemctl --system deamon-reload” and restart the DHCP
service (”$ systemctl restart dhcpd.service”).
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4.3.4 SNTP
For the SNTP service was necessary to install the ntp package. The SNTP service provides
time information to devices connected to the network. This information can be used for
time synchronization. This service is provided in the internal network and in the network
between the IDS interface and the router (for time sync of the router). The configuration
file is located in /etc/ntp.conf. As is shown in Figure 4.12 it is necessary to modify the
networks where the service will be provided and the time servers. This time servers are
used to obtain information about the actual time.
...
restrict 192.168.123.0 mask 255.255.255.0 nomodify notrap
restrict 192.168.30.0 mask 255.255.255.0 nomodify notrap
...
server 0.cz.pool.ntp.org
server 1.cz.pool.ntp.org
server 2.cz.pool.ntp.org
server 3.cz.pool.ntp.org
...
Figure 4.12: Modifications in the SNTP configuration file
4.3.5 NetFlow
The NetFlow Collector is located in the internal network (IP address 192.168.123.1/24).
The Collector is listening on port 9996. The software used to collect NetFlow records is the
NetFlow Analyzer 112. To install NetFlow Analyzer 11 it is required to install Java SDK.
The software (NetFlow Analyzer) collects NetFlow records and also provides a web interface
for visualization and data analyzing. Figure 4.13 shows several steps of the installation
process. Represented by red color is the installation directory where the analysis software
will be installed. In this case the default path will be /opt/ManageEngine/NetFlow. In
this directory are placed all binary files and scripts for execution of this software. These
scripts are placed in the ./bin directory. To run this software it is necessary to execute the
script run.sh in this directory. The number 9996 in blue color represents the port, where
the NetFlow Collector will be listening. The number 8080 in orange color is the port of the
web server. To access the GUI when the NetFlow analyzer is running, it is necessary to
type in the web browser the address http://localhost:8080. The default login and password
required to access the application are
”
admin“,
”
admin“.
4.3.6 IDS and IPS
The IDS/IPS software used in this project was Snort. Regarding the installation and
configuration, there are several documents3 on the Snort project website.
The first step of the installation is to install the dependencies. The dependencies re-
quired for this software are gcc, flex, bison, zlib, zlib-devel, libpcap, libpcap-devel,
pcre, pcre-devel, libdnet, libdnet-devel and tcpdump.
The next required step is to install the Snort packages. Several installation packages
are provided depending on the type of the operating system. In this scenario it was used
2For more information: https://www.manageengine.com/products/netflow/.
3Useful documents for Snort installation/configuration: https://www.snort.org/documents.
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Figure 4.13: NetFlow Analyzer installation
packages for CentOS 7. The RPM packages necessary for the installation are daq4 and
snort5. It is possible to install them by the yum command. The configuration file of the
Snort installation is placed in /etc/snort/snort.conf. In this file is possible to specify the IP
addresses of the devices in the network that provide services (DNS, FTP, SQL, etc.), home
network, external network, monitoring rules, etc. An example of the Snort configurations
is shown in Figure 4.14.
...
ipvar HOME NET 192.168.123.0/24
ipvar EXTERNAL NET !$HOME NET
# List of DNS servers on your network
ipvar DNS SERVERS $HOME NET
# List of SMTP servers on your network
ipvar SMTP SERVERS $HOME NET
# List of web servers on your network
ipvar HTTP SERVERS $HOME NET
# List of sql servers on your network
ipvar SQL SERVERS $HOME NET
...
Figure 4.14: Snort configurations in snort.conf file
In the same file it is also necessary to set rules. It is possible to obtain rules from
several sources (paid rules, basic rules provided by Snort project or free to use rules). In
this project were used rules6 under GLPv2 license and subscribed rules provided by the
Snort project. The rules need to be placed in the /etc/snort/rules directory. It is possible
to find in an additional file all additional options (include < option >)7. These includes
need to be copied to the snort.conf file.
4Daq package: https://www.snort.org/downloads/snort/daq-2.0.5-1.centos7.x86_64.rpm.
5Snort package:https://www.snort.org/downloads/snort/snort-2.9.7.3-1.centos7.x86_64.rpm.
6Snort rules: https://rules.emergingthreats.net/open/snort-2.9.0/emerging.rules.tar.gz.
7Additional config. file: https://rules.emergingthreats.net/open/snort-2.9.0/emerging.conf.
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Chapter 5
Security incidents
5.1 Reconnaissance attack
In this experiment will be shown an attack by nmap application for scanning open ports
of the server placed in the internal network. The basic topology was slightly modified, as
shown in Figure 5.1. The attacker is placed in the 192.168.30.0/24 network. This network
is used for transferring traffic between the internal network and the router. The IDS is
running on the interface with IP address 192.168.30.253.
Figure 5.1: Topology of the experiment
This type of attack is very difficult to recognize. The maximum bandwidth captured in
the internal network was not more than 80KB/s. Figure 5.2 shows the bandwidth of the
whole experiment. Thus, the bandwidth cannot be used for attack recognition.
A better way to recognize the attack is to monitor the captured traffic in the network.
The Nmap application has an unique sequence of messages that are sent to the target. It
makes the recognition easier.
5.1.1 Traffic analysis
In this experiment the attacker used a TCP SYN packet for port recognition. The technique
behind this attack is to not open a full TCP connection. The Nmap application will just
send a SYN packet and wait for a response. Using this packet the attacker asks if the
port (where the packet was sent) is open or not. The victim can answer with two types
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of messages. The first type is a SIN/ACK message (it can also be SYN without ACK),
representing an open port in the victim’s device. The second one is a RST message, that
indicates a non listening port. The port is also marked as filtrated if no answer is received,
or if ICMP unreachable error is received. This description is valid only for TCP SYN scan.
Attacks based on other techniques have also different packet types and sending orders. [13].
Figure 5.2: Bandwidth of the server during the attack
Figure 5.3 shows part of the captured traffic from the experiment. It is shown the 5900
port scanning, which is commonly used as a listening port for servers providing VNC service
[23]. This communication consists of two ACK messages where the attacker scans the port
and the victim responds (RST message), indicating a non listening port.
Figure 5.3: Negative answer of nmap scanning
An example of the traffic is shown in Figure 5.4 where there is a communication (between
the attacker and the victim), indicating that port 22 is listening (SSH service)1. The
attacker sent a SIN message and received a SIN/ACK response from the victim. The
attacker subsequently answered with a RST message. This message canceled the TCP
negotiation.
Figure 5.4: Positive answer of nmap scanning
1IANA: http://www.iana.org.
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5.1.2 IDS analysis
IDS devices provide real time monitoring. This type of device monitors traffic, creates alerts
and log files. Using the alerts is very easy to identify the type or the source of the attack.
An example of a Snort alert is shown in Figure 5.5. This Figure shows an alert of a potential
VNC attack. Alerts consist of the names of potential intrusions, priorities, IP addresses,
port numbers, etc. All the traffic is analyzed using rules. In this experiment the rules did
not cover all the scans. It means that malicious traffic was evaluated as normal traffic or
rules did not recognize all the malicious activity. It is possible to change these rules or add
custom rules, depending on the network topology or the administrator requirements. These
modifications require detailed analysis of the attack.
...
[**] [1:2002910:5] ET SCAN Potential VNC Scan 5800-5820 [**]
[Classification: Attempted Information Leak] [Priority: 2]
07/22-10:39:52.239341 192.168.30.254:36939 -> 192.168.123.1:5815
TCP TTL:58 TOS:0x0 ID:7937 IpLen:20 DgmLen:44
******S* Seq: 0x94AFDCC7 Ack: 0x0 Win: 0x400 TcpLen: 24
TCP Options (1) => MSS: 1460
[Xref => http://doc.emergingthreats.net/2002910]
[**] [1:2002910:5] ET SCAN Potential VNC Scan 5800-5820 [**]
[Classification: Attempted Information Leak] [Priority: 2]
07/22-10:39:52.341856 192.168.30.60:36940 -> 192.168.123.1:5815
TCP TTL:45 TOS:0x0 ID:38641 IpLen:20 DgmLen:44
******S* Seq: 0x94ACDCC4 Ack: 0x0 Win: 0x400 TcpLen: 24
TCP Options (1) => MSS: 1460
[Xref => http://doc.emergingthreats.net/2002910]
...
Figure 5.5: Example of a snort alert of a potential VNC scan
Figure 5.6 shows all Snort log records captured during the experiment. Using these
records is possible to realize the attack quicker and perform a more effective analysis of
potential attacks. The logged records (unlike the captured traffic by tcpdump) are filtrated,
with only necessary packets being stored in the file.
Figure 5.6: Captured packets by Snort
The result of the attack (what is visible to the attacker) is the list of ports used by
the server. Using this result the attacker can create a map of the network topology and
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prepare an intrusion to this topology. In the Figure 5.7 are shown statistics from the nmap
application achieved with the experiment.
Figure 5.7: Data acquired by the attacker
5.2 Malware
The second experiment consists of monitoring malware activity in the network topology.
The infected victim machine has IP address 192.168.123.52/24. The malware2 used in
this project at first sight looks like a porn movie with the name ZeroAccess xxx porn -
-movie.avi.exe. After the execution it tries to cover its identity behaving like Adobe
Flash Player. The execution starts the download process of additional malware sources for
later malicious activity. Figure 5.8 shows a pop-up window that displays the immediate
execution.
Figure 5.8: Malware pop-up window
When the download activity is finished, the malicious software informs a connection
problem and ask for a new execution. After receiving a confirmation by the user, the
download process message is shown again. An example of the message is shown in Figure
5.9.
5.2.1 Analysis using Netflow Analyzer
During the experiment were used several monitoring systems. The Netflow Analyzer pro-
vides several information, useful for faster analysis (bandwidth protocol usage).
The bandwidth captured by the router during the experiment is shown in Figure 5.10.
It is possible to notice in the figure that the maximum bandwidth of the application was
2Source of the malware software: https://github.com/ytisf/theZoo.
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Figure 5.9: Malware warning message
around 712,5 KB/s. The maximum was reached during the download phase. From this
amount of data transferred it is possible to realize the presence of some malicious software.
Figure 5.10: Malware bandwidth
Statistics regarding application usage are shown in Figure 5.11. It is possible to notice
that the biggest amount of communication was made by HTTP protocol. It indicates that
the malicious software was using some HTTP mirror server to download resources.
During the experiment the most used destination address was 192.168.123.52. It means
that the malicious software was attacking only the victim’s machine and it did not try to
distribute itself to other machines. Thus, the malicious software was not a worm. Figure
5.12 shows the statistics of the top destination addresses captured by the NetFlow Collector.
The biggest amount of data was sent from the IP address 2.16.190.8. It is possible to
consider that this IP address belongs to the main communication channel of the malicious
software. Figure 5.13 shows the statistics of the top source IP addresses analyzed by the
NetFlow Collector.
It is possible to use the data from the NetFlow Analyzer for oﬄine traffic analysis. The
obtained information (source addresses, destination addresses) can be useful to find the
source of the attack faster.
5.2.2 Traffic analysis
The oﬄine traffic analysis can help deepen the understanding about the malware software
activity. The basic information used for analysis was the source addresses captured by
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Figure 5.11: Top application usage report
Figure 5.12: Top destination addresses report
the NetFlow Collector. The first analyzed traffic was the HTTP packets, because previous
analysis shows that the malware was probably communicating with a HTTP mirror server.
After analysis of the HTTP headers, it was possible to notice that the traffic belonging to
the IP addresses 193.51.224.40 and 193.51.224.41 was related to Windows updates. During
the experiment it had a traffic of more than 100 MB.
Figure 5.14 shows the initialization of a TCP connection and a HTTP GET request to
download additional malicious software. The communication took place between the victim
device (192.168.123.52) and the server where the malicious software is stored (2.16.190.8).
A detailed view of the HTTP header of the packet is shown in Figure 5.15. The header
consists of a Request URI and a full request message. These fields and the destination IP
address are marked by red color.
After the installation phase of the malware activity it was detected a weird traffic con-
sisting of UDP packets. The destination addresses, according to the tool whois, were
several organizations around the world (especially countries where tracking or persecuting
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Figure 5.13: Top source addresses report
Figure 5.14: Initialization of the malware activity
Figure 5.15: URI request for downloading additional malicious software
the attacker is impossible). For example, the address 190.253.253.254 belongs to COLOM-
BIA TELECOMUNICACIONES S.A. ESP and the address 95.220.96.13 belongs to Net By
Net Holding LLC (IP address registered in Russia). Almost all UDP traffic communicates
with the same destination port, which is 16465. Figure 5.16 shows an example of the traffic.
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Figure 5.16: Malware network activity
5.2.3 IDS analysis
In this experiment were used rules provided by the Snort project under subsciption. An IDS
station was running on the interface with IP address 192.168.30.253. During the experiment
were captured several alerts and packets for analysis.
As shown in Figure 5.17 the IDS monitoring detects several incidents. The incidents
were classified as Trojan Horse (type ZeroAccess) outbound communication. During the
experiment were also captured around 600 packets for detection by the Snort IDS. Thanks
to this monitoring system it is possible to recognize not only incoming attacks but also
infected machines inside the monitoring network.
...
[**] [1:23493:5] MALWARE-CNC Win.Trojan.ZeroAccess outbound communication [**]
[Classification: A Network Trojan was Detected] [Priority: 1]
07/26-15:39:50.658445 192.168.123.52:58732 -> 184.253.253.254:16465
UDP TTL:128 TOS:0x0 ID:23612 IpLen:20 DgmLen:44 DF
Len: 16
[Xref => http://www.virustotal.com/file/50cdd9f6c5629630c8d8a3a4fe7
d929d3c6463b2f9407d9a90703047e7db7ff9/analysis/]
[**] [1:23493:5] MALWARE-CNC Win.Trojan.ZeroAccess outbound communication [**]
[Classification: A Network Trojan was Detected] [Priority: 1]
07/26-15:39:51.656702 192.168.123.52:58732 -> 190.253.253.254:16465
UDP TTL:128 TOS:0x0 ID:23613 IpLen:20 DgmLen:44 DF
Len: 16
[Xref => http://www.virustotal.com/file/50cdd9f6c5629630c8d8a3a4fe7
d929d3c6463b2f9407d9a90703047e7db7ff9/analysis/]
...
Figure 5.17: Snort malware detection alerts
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Chapter 6
Conclusion
6.1 Summary
In this paper was shown the configuration of a network topology and the analysis of net-
work incidents from network traffic. The network topology presents several monitoring
tools. These tools can be used to exposure computer attack/intrusions or malware activities
(worms, Trojan horses, etc.). Several experiments show how to use these tools to uncover
these malicious activities in the network. It was also developed several configuration files
to make it easier to configure the monitoring station.
6.2 Improvements
There are several possible improvements related to this work. Probably one of the most
interesting ones would be a detailed software analysis of the malware software (binary data
analysis). This improvement would help find weak points of the network topology and also
design mechanisms to avoid an intrusion like that. There is also other alternative IDSs.
Another improvement could be the comparison of results and rules from Snort and Suricata
(another IDS). This comparison can also include practical and economical analysis of these
IDSs.
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Appendix A
CD Content
 scripts: configuration scripts of the CentOS server and the Mikrotik router
 rules: Snort rules
 pcap: captured traffic from experiments
 log: log files from IDS
 malware: malware software used in the experiments
 doc: latex source files
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Appendix B
DNS zone files
Zone file leopard.org (/var/named/leopard.org):
$TTL 1D
@ IN SOA zeus.leopard.org. root.leopard.org. (
2014071001 ;Serial
3600 ;Refresh
1800 ;Retry
604800 ;Expire
86400 ;Minimum TTL
)
IN NS zeus.leopard.org.
IN A 192.168.123.1
;srvce.port.owner-name ttl class rr pri weight port target
http. tcp.leopard.org. IN SRV 0 5 80 www.leopard.org.
http. udp.leopard.org. IN SRV 0 5 80 www.leopard.org.
zeus IN A 192.168.123.1
www IN A 192.168.123.1
dns IN A 192.168.123.1
ns IN A 192.168.123.1
Reverse zone file 123.168.192.db (/var/named/123.168.192.db):
$TTL 86400
@ IN SOA zeus.leopard.org. root.leoaprd.org. (
2014071001 ;Serial
3600 ;Refresh
1800 ;Retry
604800 ;Expire
86400 ;Minimum TTL
)
IN NS zeus.leoaprd.org.
; define IP address and hostname
1 IN PTR zeus.leopard.org.
1 IN PTR www.leopard.org.
1 IN PTR ns.leoaprd.org.
1 IN PTR dns.leopard.org.
41
